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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
George Lakoff teaches linguistics and cognitive science at the University of 
Califomia, Berkeley. Together with such figures as James McCawley, Paul Postal, and Haj 
Ross, he was one of the founders of the Generative Semantics movement in the 1960's. This 
represented the earliest major depamre from the standard Chomskyan Generative 
Transformational Grammar by demonstrating the fundamental role played by semantics and 
pragmatics in grammar. Since the mid-1970's Lakoff has become a leading figure in the 
development of Cognitive L i i s t i c s ,  which grounds linguistic theory in empirical findings 
from the field of Cognitive Psychology . He has studied conceptual systems in depth, although 
the bulk of his most recent research has increasingly focused on metaphor and its 
consequences for abstract reasoning. 
He is the author of Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, and co-author of Metaphors 
We Live By (with Mark Johnson), and More Than Cool Reason (with Mark Turner). His most 
recent book, Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don't, analyses the 
language of political discourse and demonstrates that conservative and liberal ideas are based 
on opposite metaphorical models of the family and morality. At present, he is writing 
Philosophy in the Flesh, in collaboration with Mark Johnson, which interprets philosophy 
from the point of view of cognitive science. He is also working, with Rafael Núiíez, on the 
metaphorical stnicture of mathematics. 
INTERVIEW' 
Good afternoon, Professor Lakoff. First of all, I'd like to go back to rhe late 1960's 
and early 1970's. This is the penod of Generative Sernantics for you and a nurnber of orher 
people, like Paul Postal, Haj Ross, and James McCawley, who had been stuúying wirh 
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Chomsky. Whar are your recollections from that period? What was going on? 
A lot was going on. Generative Semantics started forme as early as 1963. At the time 
1 was just a fust year graduate student and 1 had previously done work on the structure of 
discourse. 1 had done an undergraduate thesis which was the first story grammar. 1 had tried 
to put a narrative structure into a transformational framework, and in doing so, it occurred 
to me that one could possibly generate whole stories, starting with plot structure and working 
down to sentences. 
But in order to do that 1 had to have a semantic base for the sentences, since the plot 
structure 1 proposed was given in semantic terms. At that time semantics meant logic, mainiy 
the traditional formal logic. And so 1 asked if it was possible to have logical forms be 
underlying structures in a transformational grammar. 1 figured out how to restructure logical 
frorns so that they would fit transfromational rules. Technically, it might be possible. The 
question was whether there was any independent empirical evidence from syntax that this was 
the right thing and to do. 1 set out to get such evidence. 
1 conceived the following idea. Look at the properties of logical forms. There are 
seven basic properties: 
(1) predicate-argument structure; 
(2) scope differences; 
(3) co-referente, that is, identical variables; 
(4) binding of variables by quantifiers; 
(5) propositional function structure (where one or more variable is unfilled); 
(6) inferences, and 
(7) sublexical structure. 
The question 1 asked back in 1963 was: Do these properties of logical forms, rnost 
of them structural (except for inferences), show up in grammar? Then 1 went looking for 
evidence. 
The first evidence 1 noticed concerned prelexical structure. 1 looked at causative 
sentences like, He warmed the milk, where you have something like "he caused the milk to 
become warm". 1 argued that, in order to state the proper generalizations about (1) the 
distribution of the word " w m "  and (2) the relationship between the causative, the 
inchoative, and the stative constructions, one would have to posit underlying structures, that 
is, logical forms, in which there was an abstract causative predicate and an abstract 
inchoative predicate. Such analyses have now become cornmonplace. 
1 also looked at some sentences from baseball -1 was an avid baseball fan at the time. 
1 still am. The sentence 1 chose was about a Boston Red Sox player named Carl Yastremsky 
(who was a young player back in 1963, but now is in the Hall Of Fame). The example was: 
Yastremsky doubled off the wall, where what went "off the wall" was the ball. The 
generalization about where directional phrases like "off the wall" occur depends on looking 
at the meaning of the verb "doubled." You have to know that "double" means to hit a ball 
so that you run for two bases. "Off the wall" expreses where the ball goes; it requires a 
therne that is a moving entity. Its syntactic occurrence, therefore, depends in part on the 
sernantics of the verb in the sentence it occurs in. 
One could not say, for example, *Yastremsky slepr off the wall, because there would be 
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nothing moving off the wall. Similarly, in YastremsS, doubled to lefrfield, the ball went tu 
lefrfield. You can't say *Yastremski stood to lefrfield because there is nothing going to left 
field. 1 argued that, to state the generalizations goveming the distribution of such adverbs, 
one had to postulate abstract underlying logical forms that represented meanings. 
That was in 1963. 1 wrote "Toward Generative Semantics" for a surnrner research 
project where 1 was working with Gil Harman and Jim McCawley, who were then graduate 
students. That surnmer, Harman wrote the first paper showing that phrase structure grarnmars 
could do everything transforrnational grammars of a reasonable sort could do (almost 15 
years before Gazdar showed the same thing). McCawley was working on phonology. We 
became friends and 1 gave him one of the 20 copies 1 made of the paper. 1 had met Paul 
Postal and 1 also gave him a copy of the paper. And 1 gave Haj Ross a copy of the paper. 
Chomsky hated it. He thought the idea of logical fonn in grammar was ridiculous. 
But he later adopted the idea, or didn 't he? 
He later adopted it, but at first he was dismissive. He thought it was stupid. 
Why ? 
1 don't really know. Paul Postal suggested that this was because 1 suggested this 
before Chomsky's Aspects theory -this was '63. Chomsky's Aspects theory was formulated 
in '64 and published in '65. Postal knew that the Aspects theory was being developed and he 
suggested that, if 1 waited, then there might be a Chomskyan framework in which to frame 
my ideas. So 1 didn't push Generative Semantics right away. 
1 waited, but meanwhile 1 looked for more evidence that logical form occurred in 
grarnmar. McCawley, Ross, Postal, and 1 found a great deal of evidence. Consider, for 
example, evidence for propositional functions. We looked at sentences like The children are 
ready to eat and so are the chickens. On Chomsky's account at that time, the sentence should 
be four ways ambiguous; that is, the children are re@ to eat or be eaten, and the chickens 
are ready to eat orbe eaten. But the sentence is actually only two ways ambiguous. That was 
explained by Jirn McCawley , who suggested that the sentence was formed not simply by verb 
phrase deletion; rather, what occurred was the deletion of a verb phrase paired with its 
propositional function; if you included the semantics of the verb phrase as well as the 
syntactic form in the mle of verb phrase deletion, then identical propositional functions 
would be involved. McCawley's proposal was later decisively demostrated by Ivan Sag in 
his dissertation, in a very different framework, about ten years after that. 
Then there were other kinds of examples. For example, in Logical Form, a negative 
is outside of the proposition it negates. The question 1 asked was: Are there any sentences 
that indicate that the underlying syntactic structure of negative sentences has a propositional- 
externa1 negative in it underlying syntactic stmcture? We found some sentences that indicated 
that. For example, John didn't many Mary although the fortune teller hadpredicted ir, where 
the "it" indicates that he did marry Mary, and has to refer to a proposition inside the scope 
of the negative. That is, the negative has to be seen as outside the scope of the sentence as 
you would have it in Logical Form. 
That was another bit of evidence that Logical Form could show up in grammar. 1 
looked at tense logics, where the tense is usually outside of the proposition. In tense logic, 
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a sentence like John lefr contains the proposition "John leaves", which is true in the past. The 
past tense is an operator outside of "John leaves". We found sentences like the Republicans 
won in 1968 but it won 't happen in 1972, where the "it" refers to the "Republicans win", 
without a tense. That means you have to be able to isolate the constituent "Republicans win" 
from the tense, which means that the "it" must have as its antecedent a proposition 
completely inside the scope of the past tense operator, as in tense logic. 
Would ChomsS, have been able to handle that kind of example? 
He never looked at them so far as 1 know, and he refused to discuss them with us, 
and to this day 1 don't know if he has looked at them. He refused to talk to us when we 
started discussing these examples so 1 simply don't know if he has thought about them at all. 
Following the line of discussion we are having right now, would you like to outline 
briejly your own evolution from being a Generative Semanticist up to your present work on 
metaphor ? 
Well, what happened was this. In 1974 1 discovered a class of sentences that showed 
that there could not be single underlying syntactic structures, whether they were logical forms 
or not. They were examples that could not be handled by any transformational theory, or any 
theory with syntactic derivations. Not oniy was Chomskyan transformational grammar 
inadequate, but Generative Semantics was as well: Generative Semantics could not work 
because both the logic and transformational grammar weren't-adequate. 
The sentences were called syntactic amalgams, and let me give you an example of one 
of two or three types. Take the sentence John invited you'll never guess how many people 
to the party. These sentences were brought to my attention by Haj Ross, who heard them 
from Avery Andrews when he was a graduate student at MIT. To handle this sentence. 
Andrews had postulated a very strange transformation. He said that John invited you '11 never 
guess how many people to the party, was to be derived transformationally from You'll never 
guess how many people John invited to the party. He observed that the only way you could 
do it would be to move "John invited to the party" to the front of the sentence and then stick 
"you'll never guess how many" into the middle in exactly the right spot. 
That seemed to me like a very unlikely transformation. But in order to prove that it 
couldn't work that way you had to show that you could have more than one in a given 
sentence, because on his analysis you would only be able to have one such higher sentence 
to put into the middle of the sentence. So 1 tried constructing sentences with multiple cases. 
It wasn't hard. 1 wound up consmcting sentences with as many as six in the middle. Here's 
one with four: John invited you'll never guess how many people to you can imagine what 
kind of a party, for God knows what reason on wasn't it last Saturday?. That sentence has 
no single Logical Form or underlying structure, and it has no single transformational 
derivation. The reason is that, if it were to be derived transformationally, the topmost clause 
in the surface form would have to be embedded in logical form in al1 the other clauses at 
once. It just cannot be done technically. It occurred to me that you needed a very different 
notion of grammar, something like contemporary Construction Grammar or Cognitive 
Grammar, in order to account for sentences like this. 
That was the beginning of my interest in construction-based grammars, back in 1974. 
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Then in 1975 1 got a small grant from the National Science Foundation to have a Summer 
Seminar of eight people on linguistics, logic, and artificial Intelligence. 1 wanted to see how 
logic and artificial intelligence entered into the study of grarnrnar and 1 invited some 
remarkable people like David Lewis, Lauri Karmnen, Teny Winograd, and so on. The word 
went out thraugh the linguistics underground that we were having this seminar. Many people 
asked if they could just come and join, and 1 said yes, and before 1 knew it 188 people had 
decided to come to Berkeley. 1 hired a graduate student at MIT -1van Sag, now a 
distinguished professor at Stanford- as my research assistant. He set up comunes  in 
fraternity houses for anyone who came. He managed to house over 180 linguists here for 6 
weeks for what became an underground summer institute. We had no offical courses and no 
official teachers. What we did was set up a schedule of lectures from 10 in the morning to 
10 at night in various rooms around the university, for 6 days a week, with the rule that 
anyone could lecture with 3 days' notice. Anyone who came and wanted to talk could simply 
talk. You just had to give us three days' notice to put you on the schedule. There were an 
enormous number of very interesting lectures that summer and among these lectures where 
lectures that convinced me that formal logic could not work for semantics at all. 
Let me give you some examples of the people who lectured that summer. One of the 
first was Paul Kay. He presented results that he, Brent Berlin, and Chad McDaniel had 
gotten on the universals of color terms, and he explained these results on the basis of studies 
of the neurophysiology of color vision that was being done in the Psychology Department 
here by Russ DeValois. What Kay and his co-workers had observed in their color research 
was that the central members of colors were the same al1 over the world, even though the 
boundaries of the categories were different. Moreover that there is a hierarchy of colors 
constraining how new basic color terms get introduced into a language over time. What they 
showed was that the hierarchy and the centrality of the colors was predictable from the 
neurophysiology . 
When 1 heard this lecture, 1 was still a believer in formal logic and model theoretic 
semantics. But 1 knew enough about the technical foundations of those fields to understand 
that this was a counterexample to my enterprise of what 1 had called "natural logic," the 
attempt to extend formal logic to deal with natural language semantics. The reason is this: 
Model-theoretic semantics characterizes meaning in terms of reference and truth 
conditions. To get the meaning of a sentence, you have to relate symbols in the Logical Form 
to things in the world, or some set-theoretical model of the world. The mind and the brain 
are not in any formal model. Formal models are supposedly set-theoretical models of the 
externa1 world. The assumption is that meaning is public, that the world has an objective 
structure, and that al1 meanings can be given in terms of the objective structure of the 
extemal world, with no reference to the mind or brain. 
For example, to get the meaning of a sentence like The chair is red in formal 
semantics, you have to assume that there is a set of red things objectively out there in the 
world; the meaning of "red" is given by designating that set. The sentence The chair is red 
is true if and only is the object designated by "the chair" is in the set of red things in the 
objective extemal world. 
What Kay and McDaniel together with DeValois and his co-workers had shown was 
that there is no such thing as a set of red things in the world. Red is created by the color 
cones in your retina and by the neural circuitry of your brain given certain conditions in the 
world. But the category red isn't in the world. What you see as red is not strictly a matter 
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of wave length. It depends on color conditions and al1 kinds of other local physical 
phenomena; given that, the category is created by your eye and your brain by the fact that 
you have three types of color cones and there are certain kinds of neural circuitry. That 
means that model-theoretical semantics for natural language cannot work for the meaning of 
color terms iike "red. " Since Generative Semantics used model-theoretic semantics, there was 
something fundamentally wrong with Generative Semantics as well. If logic din't work, 
Generative Semantics couldn't. 
The next week 1 heard a lecture by Eleanor Rosch. It was one of her first lectures on 
basic-leve1 categories. She was reporting on her new research. What that research had shown 
was that certain categories were psychologically basic, like "chair" as opposed to "furniture", 
or "rocking chair". What she meant by 'psychologically basic' was that "chair" was defined 
partly by mental images -you can get a mental irnage of a chair but not of a piece of 
furniture- and partly by motor programs and body movements. You have motor programs 
for sitting down in a chair but you have no motor prograrns for interacting generally with a 
piece of furniture. 
What she showed was that this very basic level, which is the level learned first by 
children, seems to be the optimal level at which people interact with the world with their 
bodies. That level of categorization, with its special properties, is determined not by anything 
out in the world but in part by your body and your perceptual system. In short, the 
conceptual category chair has properties not in the objective externa1 world, but rather 
determined by the body and brain. Basic-leve1 categories, like color categories, cannot be 
handled by model theory, because there is no body in model theory. There is no brain or 
perceptual system in model theory. Again, formal logic didn't work for natural language 
semantics. 
The next important talk 1 heard in the sumrner of 1975 was Chuck Fillmore's first talk 
on Frame Semantics, in which he discussed semantic fields like "buy", "sell", "cost", 
"price". He showed that their semantic relationships were determined by holistic stmctures, 
like Schankian scripts or scenarios. A word like "buy" or "sell" presupposes a script in 
which you have elements like a buyer, a seller, goods and money. At first the seller has the 
goods and the buyer has the money, the seller wants the money and the buyer wants the 
goods. In the second part of the scenano, they exchange goods and money, and in the third 
part the buyer has the goods and the seller has the money. 
Once you see that you can see the meaning of the words is defined relative to this kind 
of stmcture -and Fillrnore gave many, many examples in which the meaning of words 
requires stmctures of this sort. But the structures are not objectively out there in the world. 
In fact, sometimes there are altemative frame stmctures which are inconsistent with one 
another. 
For instante, the words "thrifty" and "stingy". The word "thrifty" is defined with 
respect to a frame in which you are concerned about the efficient use of resources, and in 
that frame the opposite of "thrifty" is "wasteful". A sentence like He is not thnfry, he is 
wasteful makes sense relative to such a frame, where the issue is the use of resources. 
Now take a word like "stingy", whose opposite is "generous". The frame with how 
badly someone wants to keep his money for himself, versus and how much he is willing to 
give it to somebody else. In a sentence like He is not stingy, he is generous, you are using 
that frarne. 
Now consider the sentence He is not thrifry, he is sringy. What I'm doing in this sentence 
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is negating one frame and proposing another. I'm saying 'you should not think of his actions 
in terrns of efficient use of resources; you should think of his actions in terrns of greed'. 
Now there is nothing in formal semantics that allows you to provide alternative 
framings of the world. In formal semantics you just have simply a state of the world that 
exists or doesn't. Fillmore was demonstrating that in a single sentence you could be talking 
abour the way in which you conceptually frame the world. To characterize the meaning of 
sentence about alternate conceptualizations, you need not a logical theory but a cognitive 
theory in which one can talk about alternate conceptual framings. In formal logic, there is 
no cognition, and no capacity for alternative frame in a single sentence. Such examples 
indicated that formal logic was inherently inadequate for dealing with natural language 
semantics. Instead, one has to bring the mind into semantics. 
The next great talk 1 heard in the surnrner of 1975 was by Leonard Talmy. It was one 
of his first talks on spatial relations. What he showed was that there are certain universals 
of spatial relations that have to do with bodily orientation and with what he called cognitive 
ropology, that is, with the topological structures we irnpose on space. For example, the word 
"in", in its most basic spatial sense, has to do with a bounded region of space - a container 
with an interior, a boundary, and an exterior. Such a cognitively imposed container can 
stretch - it can be any size, any shape. Containers preserve a certain topology. Talmy 
observed that the concept of a path is also topological in this sense. You can stretch or twist 
a path and it remains a path. 
In addition to such cognitive topological concepts for spatial relations, Talmy pointed 
out that other spatial terms have bodily orientations, like "front" and "back" and "up" and 
"down" and so on. The fronts and back of objects are not pan of a mind-free, humar-free 
world. They are imposed by human beings in certain regular ways. To characterize the 
meanings of spatial relations concepts, you have to bring in the peculiarities of the human 
body and the kind of cognitively structured topology that occurs with containers, paths, and 
other concepts. Again, the body was entering into natural language semantics. 
So, in the face of al1 this evidence, in the surnmer of 1975, 1 realized that both 
transformational gramrnar and formal logic were hopelessly inadequate and 1 stopped doing 
Generative Semantics. 1 didn't know what to believe, and threw myself for a year and a half 
into rethinking what al1 this meant. 1 wrote nothing for almost two years. Finally 1 wrote 
"Linguistic Gestalts" (CLS, 1977) in which 1 argued that constructions were really the basis 
of grarnmar, the the meaning of the whole could not be the meaning of the parts. Fillmore 
and 1 were developing the same basic idea about constructions around the same time, talking 
regularly . 
Then, in 1978, 1 was teaching an undergraduate seminar at Berkeley and 1 came upon 
evidence of conceptual metaphor. What happened was this: 1 was teaching Searle's paper on 
metaphor in the class. 1 thought it was a terrible paper but 1 didn't exactly know why at the 
time. There were five undergraduates in this seminar. On the day we were to discuss Searle's 
paper, one of the women in the class came in late, very upset, sat down. After a minute she 
said "I'm sorry, but I'm not going to be able to function in the class today. I've had a 
metaphor problem with my boyfriend. Maybe you can help". 
We al1 said "yes". After all, it was Berkeley in the 1970s. And it was a true cal1 for 
help. She said: "On the way over here, my boyfriend said that our relationship had hit a 
dead-end street". She said: "1 don't know what this means". So someone said: "Look, if it's 
hit a dead-end street, you can't keep going the way you've been going". Someone else said: 
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"Yeah. You might have to turn back". And then we realized that there was a whole set of 
expressions in English for conceptualizing love as a journey. Expressions like The mrriage 
is on the rocks, or The relationship is off the track, or Look how far we've come, or We rnay 
have to turn back, We are at a crossroads in the relationship, We are going in dzfferent 
directions, We may have to bail out. 
There are many different linguistic expressions for conceptualizing love as a journey. 
But there was a generalization over al1 of these separate expressions. The generalization 
could be stated as a mapping from the conceptual domain of travel to the conceptual domain 
of love: the lovers are travellers: the love relationship is a vehicle; the lovers' cornmon life 
goals are destinations; and difficulties in the relationship are impediments to travel. What we 
have here is a conceptual metaphor, a way of conceptualizing love as a journey, not just a 
bunch of metaphorical expressions. This conceptual metaphor is a way of reasoning about 
love using the inferential stmcture of the concept of a journey. 
Again we have a counteraxample to formal semantics. The conceptual metaphor is not 
in the externa1 objective world; it is in our minds. It characterizes how we conceptualize and 
reason about love in terms of a journey. Formal semantics cannot handle such cases. since 
there is no mind in formal semantics. 
That is where the Theory of Metaphor came from. 1 then discovered that Michael 
Reddy, a year earlier, had written a paper called "The Conduit Metaphor" showing the same 
things. At that point 1 started to ask how many other conceptual metaphors there are in our 
conceptual systems. Over the following year, 1 discovered 30 or 40 of them. 
In 1979, Mark Johnson visited Berkeley to teach in the Philosophy Department. 1 met 
him on the day after he arrived in Berkeley. He was going to edit a collection of papers on 
metaphor. We thought we might collaborate on a paper. The first thing we thought we would 
do would be to use the kinds of examples I'd found to argue against the recent papers by 
Searle and Davidson. 
We thought about it for a week and then we decided that it was irnpossible to write 
such a paper. The reason that it was impossible was that, in order to argue against someone, 
you have to share their presuppositions. But the evidence contradicted what Searle and 
Davidson were presupposing. They denied that meaning was in the relationship between 
words and the world. 
Instead, there are metaphorical aspects of meaning that are cognitive in nature, that 
are part of metaphorical thought. But Searle's and Davidson's theones excluded the very 
possibility of the existente of metaphoncal thought. If meanings were taken as relationships 
between symbols and the world, then there could be no room for metaphorical thought. 
What we decided to do instead was to wnte first an article and then a book telling 
why our work contradicted the presuppositions not only of Searle and Davidson, but the 
whole theory of meaning within Anglo-Amencan philosophy. We have been working on this 
project ever since, trying to show in detail how philosophy has to change in response to work 
on metaphor, categorization and other aspects of Cognitive Science. 
How does al1 this compare with the general development of linguistics in the Anglo- 
saxon world. I mean, Chomsky and offshoots, and then functional theones, and the 
increasingly large number of grammars that are being devised? 
Well let's start first with generative grammars and with Chomsky. Our work 
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cornpletely goes against it. And in an interesting way. When 1 was doing Generative 
Sernantics, 1 assurned that it would be possible to fit my work together with Chornsky's. 1 
assumed that for a very long time. And 1 assumed that the argument between me and 
Chomsky was an argument within Generative Grammar. It turned out that 1 was wrong about 
that for a very interesting reason. 
1 had certain commitments that 1 undertook when 1 started to do linguistics. The first 
comrnitrnent is what 1'11 cal1 the 'cognitive commitment'. It's the commitment to see language 
as part of the study of mind. It implied, therefore, that evidence about the nature of the mind 
could change a linguistic theory. And in fact that's just what happened in the work I've just 
described. That is, when Rosch found there were basic leve1 categories and when Kay and 
McDaniel found that color categories could not be in the externa1 world, 1 was obliged to 
change rny theory of language. The cognitive commitment was my first commitment. 
My second commitment was that 1 was concerned with stating generalizations over 
every aspect of language and across them if necessary. 
The third thing 1 had originally assumed in Generative Semantics was the classical 
theory of semantics. 1 assumed originally that semantics was the study of logic and of the 
relationship between symbols and things in the world. 
And fourth, 1 had accepted in doing Generative Sernantics certain aspects of 
generative linguistics: trees, precisely stated mles of gramrnar, accounting for al1 and only 
the well-formed sentences, but 1 included rneaning as part of sentences. 
What 1 failed to recognize at the time was that Chomsky had a very different 
understanding of generative gramrnar. Chomsky had a guiding metaphor for gramrnar, a 
rnetaphor so deeply entrenched in his intellectual worldview that he could not possibly give 
it up. Chomsky's basic metaphor was this: A sentence is a string of symbols. A language is 
a set of such strings. And a grammar is a device for generating such sets of strings. That is 
how Syntactic Structures starts out. 
Now, a sentence is not just a string of symbols. There is meaning and intonation, and 
the symbol strings are in writing, not in speech or sign. But nonetheless Chornsky adopted 
that metaphor, for reasons important to his Cartesian philosophical views. The next part of 
the metaphor is that a language is a set of such strings. This doesn't have to be tme; and in 
fact, one could argue that a language isn't a set in the technical mathematical sense of set at 
all. The third part of the metaphor is that a grarnrnar is a generative device for generating 
this "set", that is, a set of mles framed within that peculiar branch of mathematics, which 
1 now see as having nothing whatever to do with real languages. 
Chomsky was, of course, committed to his own metaphor, which he saw not as a 
rnetaphor but as a necessary truth. For hirn, recursive function theory (or equivalently the 
theory of formal grammars) is to be taken for granted as being the right mathematics for 
linguistics. This has important consequences. One of the main ones is that meaning cannot 
enter into the grammar. Why? Because the theory of formal grammars is defined so that the 
meaning of symbols cannot enter into the mles for manipulating the symbols. If you have a 
commitment to the theory of formal grammars as your required mathematics for doing 
linguistics, then you mle out the possibility that meaning couid be used in mles of syntax. 
It is a straightforward entailment of Chomsky's metaphor. This consequence is called the 
"autonomy of syntax". It's built into the basic Chomskyan metaphor and it is his highest 
priority, something he would never give up. Given any putative evidence against it, he would 
assume that the "evidence" could not be real evidence, and so would come up with an 
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auxiliary hypothesis to explain that evidence away -even if it meant missing generalizations 
about language. 
Chomsky's metaphor was something he could not give up, no matter what evidence 
was provided or generalizations were given. On the other hand, my highest commitment was 
the commitment to look at evidence from both linguistics and other cognitive sciences, and 
to take generalizations across different aspects of language very seriously. Because we had 
different commitrnents, and we were not able to articulate those differences of commitments 
clearly, conflict was inevitable. If generative semanticists found evidence that meaning 
entered into syntax, Chomsky could not accept it as real evidence, since it would conflict 
with his central metaphor for syntax. 
If the face of what we saw as evidence, he just narrowed the scope of the phenomena 
he called "syntax". Any time semantics or pragmatics was shown to enter into grammatical 
constructions or the distribution of grammatical elements (e.g., words and morphemes that 
are clearly part of grammar), Chomsky further lirnited the scope of syntax. It is now so 
narrow and uninteresting that it leaves out 95 percent of what traditional as well as early 
transformational grammarians called syntax. Anyone interested in describing al1 of a language 
will find that most of it falls outside of his "core" grammar. That is not a problem for 
Chomsky. He just isn't interested in rnost of the phenomena of language. 
Functional grammar, on the other hand, are very much in accord with Cognitive 
Grammar. It just happens to study different things. It looks at discourse function, especially 
notions like given and new information, topic, focus, and certain aspects of narrative 
structure. These are very real phenomena that are part of language. 
As it happens most cognitive linguists happen to be interested in other things. But 
Cognitive Linguistics is certainly open to al1 of functional considerations. We think that they 
are real and we greatly respect functional grammarians for their empirical approach and their 
careful study of a much wider range of phenomena in the world's languages than generative 
linguists study . 
How do you feel about Chomrky's emphasis on universalism, on his idea of a 
Universal Grammar? 
1 need to talk about what that emphasis is and where it comes from before 1 can 
answer that. Chomsky is a Cartesian, a follower of Descartes, in a very deep sense. 
Chomsky's politics also comes from Cartesianism. 
Descartes was an essentialist. He believed that there was a universal human nature 
and that there were essential properties that al1 people share that distinguish people from 
animals. Chomsky agrees with that assumption. He is also an essentialist. Again following 
Descartes' philosophy, Chomsky assumes that the mind is separate from, and characterizable 
independently of, the body. Accordingly, he believes that the study of neuroscience can shed 
no light on the nature of reason or language. 
Chomsky also seems to accept other tenets of Cartesian philosophy: 
(1) Mathematics is the best exarnple of human reason. 
(2) Mathematical reasoning is a matter of form, not content. 
(3) Hurnan reason is general is a matter of form not content. 
(4) Reason and language comprise the essence of what it is to be human. 
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(5) Since the mind is separate from and characterizable independently of the body, 
so reason and language cannot be acquired through the body. 
(6) Therefore they must be imate. 
Al1 of this is a priori Cartesian philosophy. There is no reason to accept this 
philosophical worldview, and many reasons to reject it. But let us continue. 
What do these aspects of Cartesian philosophy have to do with Chomskyan 
linguistics? The link is in certain modern a priori philosophical assumptions that were 
especially prevalent in certain philosophical circles in the1950's and 1960's. Let us cal1 this 
" Formalist Philosophy " : 
(1) Precise scientific descriptions can only be given by axioms systems. or by 
algorithms. 
(2) Proof theory in mathematical logic, Turing machines, and formal gramrnars (or 
Post systems, formulated by Emil Post) are equivalent [Church's Thesis]. 
(3) Al1 conceptual algorithms are characterizable by Turing machines (that is, the 
theory of recursive functions). 
(4) The study of meaning in natural language can be characterized by "semantics" 
- the relationship of the abstract meaningless symbols of a formal language in 
mathematical logic to the world, or at least to objectivist set-theoretical models of 
the world. In mathematical logic, there is a "formal language" made up of 
meaningless symbols. Proofs operate independently of the meaning of the symbols. 
(5) Logical proofs (especially in "natural deduction" systems) characterize human 
reason. Human reason is therefore abstract, a matter of formal symbols. Since proof 
theory and the theory of formal grammars are the same, the theory of formal 
grammars can characterize human reason. 
Chomsky's metaphor fits the a priori philosophical assumptions of formalist 
philosophy perfectly. Language is seen as a matter of abstract formal symbols. The 
mathematics of language is the theory of formal gramrnars, which is the same as proof 
theory. which is what characterizes human reason. 
Chomsky forged a link between 20th century formalist philosophy and 17th century 
Cartesian philosophy. Formalist philosophy takes it for granted that: 
(a) Reason is characterizable independently of the body 
(b) Reasoning is abstract, and a matter of pure form. 
(c) Reason is universal. 
Chomsky's metaphor fits both formalist philosophy and Cartesian philosophy perfectly 
in the way it adds language to the picture. Language for Chomsky, like Reason for 
Descartes, is what makes us human, what constitutes our essence, what separates human 
beings from the apes. (Incidentally, Chomsky for this reason must deny that anirnals have 
any language at all.) 
Language must be universal and must be imate for Chomsky, for that same reason 
that Reason had to be universal and innate for Descartes: It characterizes the essence of what 
makes al1 of us human (hence universality) and it camot be acquired through the body (hence 
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innateness) . 
Language innateness and universality theses are not empirical hypotheses for him. 
They are, for him, necessary truths that follow from his a priori philosophical assumptions 
and his central metaphor. 
Moreover, following formalist philosophy, the oniy way to be scientific is to use 
axiom systems and formal logic or, equivalently, algorithms, or, equivalently, the theory of 
formal grarnrnars. Therefore, the oniy way to do scientific linguistics is to follow Chomsky's 
metaphor and use formal grammars. 
What is the role of empirical investigation in Chomsky's view of "scientific 
linguistics"? 
For Chomsky, al1 scientific linguistics must be consistent with Chomsky's metaphor, 
formalist philosophy, and the above elements of Cartesian philosophy. There can be no 
empirical evidence against these. Al1 evidence must be made to fit these a priori 
philosophical assumptions. 
These philosophical assumptions fly in the face of a huge body of evidence found by 
generative semanticists, cognitive linguists, functional linguists -as well as a huge body of 
evidence in cognitive science and neuroscience. 
1s reason purely a matter of form rather than content? 
The answer is "No". Al1 of the work on the embodiment of reason denies it, from 
research on color concepts to basic-leve1 concepts to experimental studies of conceptual 
metaphor to Damasio's evidence of the link of reason to emotion to Teny Regier's modelling 
of the acquisition of spatial relations concepts and terms on the basis of elements of brain 
stnictures (such as topographic maps of the visual field). Reason and our conceptual systems 
arise from the body. Descartes was wrong. 
Correspondingly, cognitive studies of grarnrnar indicate that syntax is grounded in our 
conceptual system which is in turn grounded in the body. Chomsky is as wrong as Descartes 
was. 
What would you say abour the old Chomskyan idea of un innate Language Acquisition 
Device and the more modern idea of  modulan^,? 
What Chomsky has suggested cannot be true. There is no single place in the brain 
where language is located. There are different centers that do different things and they are 
linked in various ways. There cannot be such a thing in the brain as a language module. 
This is not just a matter of localization. A Chomskyan theory might say the language 
module is really distributed across various centers in the brain. But that would not work 
either. The reason is this: Chomsky's syntactic component has to be characterized in terms 
of the theory of formal grammars. That is, it must consist of symbols that are manipulated 
(or related to one another) independently of their meaning or any other psychological or 
perceptual or motor or emotional input. Because Chomsky's syntax is autonomous, his 
syntactic module must also be autonomous, which means it cannot have any input, 
irnmediately or ultimately, from anything non-syntactic, for example, anything bodily. If you 
look at Chomsky's drawings of syntax boxes in the mind, they never have any input. They 
cannot if they are to be autonomous. But such autonomy is impossible in a human brain. 
Brains are just not structured like that. There are no brain modules, localized or distributed, 
without input. 
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Yes, srill there are some psycholinguisrs thar seem ro support rhe idea of modularity. 
There are still Skinnerians too. As Tom Kuhn pointed out, old paradigms continue 
to exist long-after they are viable. 
In general the evidence doesn't bear out Chomskyan modularity. Part of the evidence 
was supposed to be that there are brain damaged people who can form gramatical sentences 
that are meaningless, and people who are the opposite, who have no sense of grammar, who 
have certain kinds of lesions where they cannot put grammatical sentences together. 
It doesn't quite work out that way. There are people who have agrammatism who can 
make grarnrnaticality judgments. They just can't say the sentences. Their agrammatism 
doesn't mean that there is a localized language box that is damaged. It only means that 
cenain neural connections required by sentence production that have been severed. 
Liz Bates reports on her research with a well-known Italian architect who had a 
stroke. He had the symptoms of agrammatism. He could only say isolated words, not 
sentences. She gave him a particular kind of sentence to see if he could repeat it. He could 
not repeat it, but he could say one word in response. That word was the name for the 
classical Greek "trope" describing what was odd about the grammar of the sentence. This 
agrammatic patient, who supposedly had his "grammar box" damaged, not only could make 
gramatical judgments but could describe them with the proper ancient Greek terminology! 
The point is simple. Agrammatism is not evidence for a grammar module in the brain. 
Mar S your opinion on parallel distn'buted processing ? 
PDP comectionism is useful for many things, like distinguishing sonar signals of 
mines from those of rocks. It may also be a reasonable model for how human beings map 
sound input into sequences of phonetic features. But it is too unstructured to characterize 
most of human reason and language. Parallel distributed processing ignores the details of 
brain structure. It asks: how much you can do with the simplest kinds of structures. The 
answer appears to be: a little bit but not that much. 
What people like J e q  Feldman and Terry Regier have done is to take comectionist 
models and model aspects of innate brain structure, for example, topographic maps of the 
visual field and orientation sensitive cells. They then ask what concepts and aspects of 
language can be leamed given those innate NONLINGUISTIC structures. The question they 
ask is: how much of conceptual structure and language is embodied, in the sense that it arises 
out of brain stnictures that exist to serve other bodily functions: perception, motor functions, 
etc. 
Let 'S go back to the end of the 1970s. Thar was a rime when there were some workers 
in artificial inrelligence that used some versions of Frame Semantics. Did that influence any 
of your thinking at rhat time? I mean, proposals like Minsky 'sframes, or Schank & Abelson 'S 
scriprs, or orhers? 
Yes. They came into being around the same time as Fillmore's Frame Semantics. 
Schank's work was based on Fillmore's earlier Case Gramrnar. 
1 was very much influenced by Schank's work. 1 leamed about his work on frames 
Cuadernos de Filología Inglesa, 612. 1997, pp.33-52 
46 Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza 
about the same time as Fillmore was beginning to develop his frame semantics. 1 spent a 
month in 1977 in Schank's lab learning what he and his students were doing. 1 becarne a part 
of that cornmunity. It was an important experience. 
You have written at length about protorypes and related phenornena in your book 
Wornen, Fire and Dangerous Things, and you discuss Schema Theoty and basic-leve1 
categorization. arnong other things. Have you ever tried to put al1 this together in a unifTed 
frarnework? 
1 have thought it through a lot. 1 can see how many things might fit together. but 1 
haven't really tried seriously to do it. It would be a huge task, much more than one person 
can do. 
I've been doing other kinds of work. I've been trying to extend metaphor theory, to 
work out the details and apply it to many areas. That is a big job in itself. 
At some time before very long, 1 would say within the next five years, some of us 
are going to have to sit down and try to unify al1 this work. But before then, 1 want to finish 
another book with Mark Johnson that we've been working on for some years. It's a big book 
on philosophy called "Philosophy in the Flesh". It is about the consequences for philosophy 
of the embodiment of mind, the cognitive unconscious, and metaphorical thought. 
Those developments, if taken seriously, would radically change western philosophy. 
We want to show exactly why it changes it and how it changes it. Before 1 even think of 
entering into a project of unifying al1 of Cognitive Linguistics, 1 want to finish that book. 1 
also want to do a book on the metaphorical sructure of mathematics. Anyway, 1 don't 
believe one person can do that unification. It is a job for the field as a whole. 
It is a difficult job. One reason why it hasn't been tackled earlier was that the separate 
parts were not very well worked out. Metaphor Theory had to be worked out, the Theory 
of Categorization had to be worked out, Langacker's Cognitive Grammar had to be worked 
out. We had to get some understanding of what image-schemas were. We had to understand 
what constmctions were. Now we have come to the point where it is almost possible to begin 
to think of the unified theory, although the recent Fauconnier-Tumer work on blending shows 
that there is a lot in those phenomena that needs to be understood better. 
Could you give me un idea of what ?he place of semantics is within grarnrnatical 
theoty in general? What is its relationship to syntax and other components? 
1 believe, just as Langacker does, and as 1 believed when 1 started doing Generative 
Semantics, that grammatical structure consists of what Langacker called "symbolization" - 
conventionalized pairings of elements of semantic structure with aspects of phonological 
structure (including ordering constraints). 
1 believe that predicate-argument relations of semantics are the predicate-argument 
relations of syntax, once symbolization -that is, the conventionalization of semantic- 
phonological pairings- has operated. 
1 believe that the propositional structure of semantics is syntactic clause structure 
under symbolization. 1 believe that semantic event structure is syntactic aspectual structure 
under symbolization. And so on. 
1 believe that the kinds of structures that you find in syntax are conventionalized 
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reflections of semantic-phonological pairings, and that there is NO autonomous syntactic 
structure at all. 
That is something that Langacker has been trying to show in very great detail with 
considerable success, 1 think. And it is something that we began to show in the mid 60s 
while looking at evidence in syntax for logical form. 
However. to really demonstrate it would take a unification of al1 the subparts of 
Cognitive Linguistics. 1 think al1 the evidence points to it, but the unification has to be done 
and no one has done it. 
You are v e q  concerned with reasoning and you have explanations about whar 
reasoning is from the point of view of metaphor and metonymy. What I would like to know 
is what yourpoint of view is on work in pragrnatics dealing with the samefield of reasoning? 
Like rhe theoq of implicature or presupposition. 
The earlier results in pragmatics that generative semanticists accomplished fits right 
in with Cognitive Semantics. Much of it can be accommodated in a relatively straightforward 
way. 1 think it is possible to take the mechanisms of Cognitive Semantics and Cognitive 
Gramrnar and use them to describe what goes on in pragmatics. 
For example, take Grice's Principle of Relevance. That is just the use of frames and 
ICMs. Relevance is fmding the appropriate ICMs for framing an utterance. Once you find 
them, there are inferences in context that follow namrally. 
Grice's Principle of Quantity can be stated in terms of the metonymic principles 
involving scales. Indirect speech acts can be characterized metonymically as it was done in 
a paper at the ICLA meeting last month by Linda Thornburg and Uwe Panther. 
Frame Semantics has a presuppositional background built into it. Composition of 
presuppositions follows the principles given in Fauconnier's mental spaces. Speech acts too 
can be characterized using frames. 
In short, 1 think every aspect of pragmatics can be expressed in terms of Cognitive 
Linguistics. The reason it hasn't been an issue in Cognitive Linguistics is that many of the 
practitioners, such as myself, Fauconnier, Fillmore. and Sweetser worked on pragmatics in 
old days back in the 60's and 70's and know how it fits in. 
So. it is assumed. 
It is assumed. 
However, for people outside Cognitive Linguistics who don't know the Cognitive 
Linguistic mechanisms, it is far from obvious. A good Cognitive Linguistics textbook should 
discuss the maner. 
1 don't mean to suggest that al1 the problems of pragmatics have been solved already 
and that Cognitive Linguistics has no new insights. Work now being done by Michael Israel 
on polarity items within Cognitive Linguistics solves certain classic problems in that area. 
What do you think about structuralist concerns with synonymy, antonymy and al1 
lexical relationships? 
1 think they are superficial consequences of Frame Semantics. If you do your Frame 
Cuadernos de Filología Inglesa, 612, 1997, pp.33-52 
48 Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza 
Semantics right, then synonymy and antonymy fa11 out. They are relative to frames. That is 
one of Fillmore's major points. 
Fillmore has shown that many apparent synonyms are not synonyms at al1 because 
they are defined by different frames. For example. he distinguishes between "on the ground" 
and "on land" and he points out that they seem to have the same truth conditions, but they 
don't really mean the same thing at all. "On the ground" has to do with the frame of 
airplanes and air travel and it is contrasted with "in the air"; whereas "on land" has to do 
with sea travel and it is contrasted with "at sea." 
Two expressions may have the same truth conditions, but if they are defined with 
respect to different frames, they are not synonymous. Linguists who just talk about 
synonymy and antonymy without frames are missing most of the relevant semantics. 
What about the idea of semuntic jields? 
Semantic fields are very real and they are defined also with respect to frames. 
Indeed, the phenomenon of semantic fields is what led Fillmore to develop Frame Semantics. 
What Fillmore showed in his very first paper on frames was that words in the same 
semantic field, like buy, sell, price, goods, cost, and so on, are defined relative to a single 
frame, and that you can oniy make sense of semantic fields with respect to Frame Semantics. 
People who just say: these words are linked together or they form a set, miss the 
inferential relationships among them. They also cannot explain their possibility for 
metaphorical use, because metaphorical use depends on the frame semantic structure. 
Is rhere any way in which Frame Semuntics can be put in the form of a dictionary? 
Absolutely. It can be and Fillmore is doing it. 
Right now? 
Right now. Fillmore is the main linguistic consultant to the Oxford English 
Dictionary. He has a major research project now in which he is trying to get computer 
representations of lexical entries using Frame Semantics. Some of his students are trying to 
incorporate metaphor and metonymy into that as well. 
Can you give me un idea of how he is doing thut? 
1 don't know the computational particulars. The analyses are very much those he has 
done in the past and in many ways like those in Cognitive Linguistics in general. 
Yes, how would you dejine your idea of an ICM?. Because I believe thut you have 
never attempted to work out a dejinition in your writings. 
The idea of an ICM is actually very simple. It's basically a frame which can have 
metaphor appended to it. Its relational elements can be characterized in terms of image- 
schemas. An ICM can be of various scopes. It can be extensive enough to be a folk theory. 
It can function as a narrative structure, or it can be some relatively small thing, 
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characterizing the structure of some small conceptual domain. 
Do you rhink machine translation will be possible? 
There are many things that are meant by machine translation.. . . 
Cornpurer-aided auromaric translation. Prograrnrnes rhar do rhar on-line, rhe sume way 
as a jlesh-and-bones rranslaror would do. And if ir is possible, whar would be rhe srarting 
poinr ? 
1 think there are real problems with it. And the reason 1 think there are problems with 
it has to do with the fact that conceptual smcture comes out of the body and human 
experience. 
Moreover. different languages may have different concepts. Many concepts are 
universal, but many are not. Members of a different cultures may have very different 
experiences and different cultural irnages that lead to different idioms. Sometimes, the 
conceptual metaphors can be different. 
I'm very skeptical about machine translation. though 1 think that machines can aid in 
cranslation in many ways. 
As rhey do righr now. 
As they do right now. 
1 think that the best use is in particular domains where there is a limited vocabulary, 
particularly a largely intemational vocabulary, as in chemistry papers. There compucers may 
help a lot. But in general 1 don't expect to see particularly good machine translations. 
Would you consider yourself still a linguist or are you a cognirive scienrisr, or are you 
rnidway bemeen rhe m o ,  or are you borh? 
I'm both. 
I'm very much a linguist. Let me te11 you what makes me a linguist. 1 study language 
including the conceptual smcture underlying language. 1 study linguistic regularities 
-regular patterns within the language, again including the conceptual system. The 
methodology 1 use in studying conceptual systems is an extension of traditional linguistic 
methodologies. Other fields don't use that methodology. 
The methodological ideas that make linguistics what it is are, 1 think, extremely 
powerful, and can be extended in general to broad issues in cognitive science. That is what 
I've been doing, in part. 1 think like a linguist and even when I'm doing conceptual analysis 
of culture. 
Now, I'm not the first linguist to do this. In fact, my f i s t  linguistics teacher was 
Roman Jakobson, who taught structuralism to Levi-Suauss. He knew that one could use 
techniques of linguistic analysis to study culture. Jakobson was a great inspiration to me in 
this respect. 
I once heard Michael Halliday say rhar rhe problem wirh linguisrics ar presenr is rhar 
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we have nor been able to crack the code, but rhar is somerhing rhar rhey have managed ro do 
in rhe realm of physics and orher natural sciences a long rime ago. Would you agree wirh 
rhar ? 
No, 1 don't agree with that at all. 
The notion of "cracking the code" is a very strange notion. A language is incredibly 
rich. It depends on conceptual systems. Conceptual systems are incredibly rich; they are not 
a simple-minded code. 
To understand conceptual systems you are going to have to understand their 
relationship to the body and neurobiology. Linguistics is inherently a cross-disciplininary 
enterprise. You cannot really understand linguistics without understanding conceptual 
structures. You cannot understand conceptual structure without looking at evidence from 
psychology and anthropology. And you can't understand why we have the conceptual 
structure we have without looking at neuroscience. 
Often you can't even describe the conceptual structure we have without some insights 
from neuroscience. As Terry Regier has shown in The Human Semantic Potential (MIT 
Press), certain aspects of spatial structure can be described adequately only via neural 
computation. 
That's a very profound result. That indicates that you cannot separate off linguistics 
as an autonomous discipline. Language and conceptual structure is enormously rich and it 
relates to perceptual systems, to motor systems, to al1 sorts of things in the body. It is not 
just a linguistic code that you are cracking. To understand spatial relations systems, you have 
to understand how relevant aspects of the visual system works. If you are going to do 
phonetics in an explanatory fashion, you have to learn how the auditory and articulatory 
systems work physically. That is not cracking a code. It is doing cross-disciplinary science. 
Your approach is very empirical. 
Entirely. 
Now, whar do you think is thefuture for linguistics? Where is linguistics heading for 
righr now? 
First, 1 should say that linguistics in America is in a very difficult position that 
Chomsky has placed it in. 
There are very few linguistics departrnents in America. There are about 50. That is 
a very small number, and there are very few jobs for linguists in Linguistics departments. 
When Chomsky's works first came out, a lot of people in other disciplines were very 
interested in the possibility that they could apply it to their disciplines -to the study of 
culture or politics or architecture or literature. But because Chomsky's theory predominated, 
and because it required that linguistics be autonomous and very narrowly defined, it became 
uninteresting to people in most other disciplines. 
These days hardly anyone in literature or architecture or political science cares about 
generative linguistics because it says nothing to them of use for their disciplines. Governrnent 
and Binding theory doesn't even te11 you very much about language or thought. 
The work in Cognitive Linguistics is very different. 1 find many people in many other 
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disciplines that are interested in the work that I'm doing, and that Fauconnier, Langacker, 
Sweetser, Tumer, and many other people are doing. We find we can talk to people in other 
disciplines very easily. 1 get invited to contribute articles to joumals in disciplines as diverse 
as art, political science, mathematics, education, psychotherapy, anthropology, philosophy, 
computer science, and public policy. As a cognitive linguist, 1 give lectures in many 
departments about ways in which Cognitive Linguistics matters to those disciplines. 
1 think that is wonderful. And 1 think it is absolutely necessary if linguistics is to 
thrive as a field that linguistics be of major relevance to other disciplines. 1 think otherwise 
it will die. 
Cognitive Linguistics is right now in the position of making very serious contributions 
to many fields. Let me give you an exarnple. 1 have a colleague in the Political Science 
department who is doing a study of forms of democracy. In the democracy literature he has 
found over 600 types of democracy. He has been able to make sense of them using Cognitive 
Linguistics. He has found that they fit a radial category structure. Using the notion of radial 
categories, he can make sense of what was previously seen as being chaotic to political 
scientists. Feature semantics and the classical theory of categories could not make sense of 
this phenomenon. 
The book I'm doing now on morality and politics and the notion of the family in 
American politics -it's called "Moral Po1itics"- depends on conceptual metaphor and radial 
categories. 1 believe it will allow us to make better sense of American politics and culture. 
My sense of things is that Cognitive Linguistics is at the point of being able to be applied 
usefully and insightfully to virtually every discipline. And it is only if it is applied to a broad 
range of disciplines that linguistics will thrive and survive. Qtherwise, linguistics is such a 
small field that it is really endangered. 
Let me give you an example of the kind of danger that it is in. When the financia1 
crisis at this university hit about two years ago and the university budget was going to be cut 
a great deal, there was a faculty comrnittee put together to ask which departments should be 
funded and which part should be cut. The Social Science comrnittee did not contain any 
linguist. It contained people from political science, history and economics who did not have 
any use for linguistics as they knew it - generative linguistics. Their report said that 
linguistics is not a very interesting discipline because it only studies language. They 
understood language as having not to do with concepts at al1 but just to do with forms. 
Now, if they were talking about Generative Linguistics, they would be correct. 
Ironically, they happened to be talking about Berkeley where we study conceptual structure, 
which can be applied to al1 of their disciplines. Our reply pointed that out. 




It will thnve for some rime? 
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1 don't think it will thrive. 1 think it will gradually decline, but 1 think Kuhn was 
basically right. A field doesn't die unti1 its practitioners die. 
The Linguistic Institute this past surnrner in New Mexico was very interesting in this 
respect. It was the first completely generative and functionalist Institute. And in fact the first 
time that any of these ideas was able to be taught at Linguistics Institutes, which have been 
largely dominated by Generativists. It was the largest Linguistic Institute ever. It had a 
wonderful faculty. Researchers in Functional and Cognitive Linguistics have become ven 
good at what they do. They have been working at it for 20 years now, and many of them are 
extraordinary scholars. 
The students were suitably impressed -students from around the country and around 
the world. Many of the students who carne there came because they were tired of Generative 
Linguistics. They couldn't care less about it. They wanted to study real language. They 
didn't want to study GB. And they were very pleased with what they found. It was a very 
exciting and interesting Institute. And 1 think that tells us about how the field is changing. 
One last question. Since you've been to Spain at least twice, what is the idea that you 
have about the development of Linguistics in my country? 
I'm extremely impressed by what 1 see in Spain. 1 first went to Spain in 1976 at the 
time of the first election after Franco's death. That was a wonderful time. 1 was in Madrid 
during the election and it was a very beautiful thing to see. 1 spent that first election day 
walking through the streets of Madrid. 
But in talking to linguists and people in artificial intelligence and people in other 
disciplines, 1 found that at that time intellectual life was very much closed off. Intellectual 
life was so awful under Franco that Spain was a very backward place. 
1 went back last year and 1 was astonished at the development that had taken place. 
In under 20 years, Spain has become a major intellectual center. In linguistics 1 found 
linguists who knew about the latest work in Cognitive Linguistics, in Functional Linguistics, 
and al1 sorts of related ideas that they understood very well. 
They were writing excellent papers and doing interesting work, asking the deepest 
possible questions. 1 couldn't have been more impressed. 1 think that the potential of Spain 
as a center for linguistics is unlimited. 
Thank you, Professor Lukoff. 1 appreciate your time. 
Thank you. It's really been a pleasure. 
NOTES 
1. The text that follows is a revised version of a transcnpt from a tape-recorded interview that 1 held with 
Professor Lakoff at Berkeley University (California) on August 31, 1995. The revision was made by Professor 
Lakoff hirnself in December 1996. 1 would like to express my appreciation to Lorena Pérez Hernández for her 
assistance in making the transcripts. 
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